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Martin Ravallion and Nanak Kakwani have reopened a
debate in which they have been engaged for some time. I find myself in
agreement with both – not with their definitions of pro-poor growth,
but with their criticisms of each other. That is to say, I find both their
definitions problematic.
Ravallion’s definition is identical with the concept of poverty-reducing
growth – any growth that reduces poverty is said to be pro-poor. In my
view, simply reducing poverty cannot, in general, be a sufficient
condition for ‘pro-poorness’. There has to be something more; in
particular, the growth process must exhibit a bias in favor of the poor.
In that sense, Kakwani’s definition is a move in the right direction.
He calls a growth process pro-poor only when the poor benefit
proportionately more than the rich. But he takes the bias to an extreme,
leading to potentially counterintuitive implications. Compare two
scenarios. In situation A, the growth rate is low but the poor benefit
proportionately more than the rich. By contrast, the growth rate in
situation B is much higher, but the poor benefit proportionately less.
Assume further that, because of higher growth, poverty is reduced more
in scenario B than A. By Kakwani’s definition, we shall characterize A as
a case of pro-poor growth but not  B, even though the poor have
actually done better in the latter! Something surely must be wrong with
our definitions if a growth process that reduces poverty more cannot be
described as pro-poor, but  one that reduces poverty less can.
Clearly, some rethinking is required. We first need to clarify the object to
which the quality of pro-poorness is to be attributed, bearing in mind
the distinction between the rate and the nature of growth – the latter
usually denoting its distributional impact. Is pro-poorness meant to
gauge the nature of growth, or  the totality of the growth process? If it
merely refers to the nature of growth, then it will no longer matter if
‘pro-poor’ growth happens to reduce poverty less than growth that is
not deemed ‘pro-poor’, and Kakwani’s definition would be the natural
one to adopt.
But if the nature of growth is what we are after, why bother to coin a new
term? We already have the concept of ‘equitable growth’, which requires
growth to be such as to benefit the poor proportionately more than the
rich. Kakwani’s definition does not add anything new to this notion.
I believe our interest in pro-poor growth goes beyond a concern
with the distributional impact of growth. It stems from a general
dissatisfaction with our past experience with growth that has made
a small impact on poverty in the developing world. We are not simply
dissatisfied with how the poor have fared relative to the rich, but also
with the scale of poverty reduction in absolute terms. While distributional
questions underlie the search for equitable growth, it is the absolute
impact on poverty that drives our present concern with growth. As such,
the quality of pro-poorness is to be attributed not just to the nature of
growth but to the totality of the growth process, including its rate.
Ravallion’s definition refers to the totality of the growth process,
whereas Kakwani’s stresses the existence of a bias in favor of the poor.
We clearly need to combine the strengths of both. The concept of pro-
poor growth must refer to the absolute magnitude of poverty reduction,
yet contain an element of bias in favor of the poor. The critical question
is how this bias is defined. I believe we must first identify a benchmark
that will allow us to gauge the ‘pro-poorness’ of growth.
Where shall we get the benchmark from? Since our concern with
pro-poor growth derives from our dissatisfaction with past growth
experiences, these can be taken as the benchmark. This means pro-poor
growth demands a break with the past that makes growth more
conducive to poverty reduction. There has to be a bias in favor of the
poor relative to the benchmark experience; from the point of view of the
poor, there must be an improvement over business as usual.
‘Pro-poor growth’ can thus be defined as a growth process that reduces
poverty more than it does in the benchmark. In general, pro-poor
growth must involve more than just poverty-reducing growth. Only in
the case where the benchmark involves no reduction of poverty would
Ravallion’s definition fit the bill, as a special case.
Of course, the benchmark will vary across countries and over time; what
is pro-poor growth in one case may not be so in another. While there
might be practical difficulties in identifying the benchmark precisely, it
should not be too difficult to identify a period in any country’s
experience during which growth was not deemed favorable to the poor.
In any case, identifying a benchmark will only be necessary if we wish to
answer whether a particular growth process is pro-poor or not in some
absolute sense. In practice, a more common concern will be a
comparative one – whether a particular set of policies is likely to be
more pro-poor than another. In this comparative context, all we shall
need is to compare the poverty-reducing effect of alternative sets of
policies. Such a comparative exercise could command agreement, even
if people disagree on the precise identification of the benchmark.